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MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: JUDGMENT AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
LOUIS H. POLLAK-1"
"The gleaming bayonets are ugly, and the cause for
their presence is enough to grieve the heart of a nation.
But they carry a proud and beautiful message. They
say what too long was unsaid before, that ours is a
government of law, that the Constitution is the su-
preme law of the land, that the Supreme Court is the
final interpreter of the Constitution, that edicts of the
Court are not to be flouted."
-Civil Liberties, Oct. 1957,
p. 1, col. 3, quoting editorial
in Louisville Courier-Journal.
SECOND in importance only to what the Supreme Court decided in the School
Cases was the fact that the Court spoke unanimously.' So often and so
sharply divided on lesser issues, the Justices spoke as one on the greatest
issue any of them had met or was likely ever to meet.2 It is certain that the
Justices are also unanimous today in their concern that Little Rock be re-
membered as the beginning rather than the end of effective compliance with
their mandate.
One may hazard the guess that of all the robed brethren the man most
profoundly troubled by present challenges to the integrity of the Court's pro-
cesses is Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Justice has devoted the better part of
a long and thoughtful career to shaping the Court's proper role in the resolu-
tion of those "conundrums of government... [which] must be solved within
the recondite legal arrangements of our federalism."3 In Frankfurter's pan-
theon are "judges who were alert in safeguarding and promoting the interests
of liberty and human dignity through law." 4 But the same judges were also
"mindful of the relation of our federal system to a progressively democratic
"Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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Michael Pertschuk, second year students at the Law School.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ; cf. Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was not, of course, unanimous; Justice
Harlan's historic dissent-notwithstanding his own failure to pursue it in later cases, see
Frankfurter, John, Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HAav. L. REv. 217, 230 (1955),
reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 3, 19-20 (195 6 )-was in a very important
sense the seed of Plessy's ultimate demise. See Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv.
150, 168-69 (1955).
3. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HoLMEs AND THE SUPREME COURT 67 (1938).
4. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (concurring opinion).
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society and therefore duly regardful of the scope of authority that was left
to the States even after the Civil War."5
In seeking the right balance, Frankfurter may in many cases seem too
insistent on giving "the freest possible scope to States,"6 overly zealous in his
"alert deference to the judgment of the state court under review, ''T too ready,
without reaching the merits, to find the issue either "political"" or otherwise
nonjusticiable, or too quick to uncover the "fatal weakness . . . that the
question of a denial of one or more putative federal rights is nowhere properly
raised on the record before us."' 0 His relentless vocabulary of self-effacement
is not without its critics-those who regard Frankfurter's "judicial self-denial"
as camouflage: "the same old conservatism, poured into new containers. .... u
This appraisal, however, "is unacceptable to those who take the more modest
view that the Court's chief concern is justice under law. For them, the great
judge is the humilitarian, the respecter of those 'technicalities' which allocate
among many agencies different responsibilities in the pursuit of Justice."'
' 2
Whichever view is taken, slogans of judicial reticence are unlikely to rouse
men's hearts and point to new horizons. Frankfurter's words have brought
few to the barricades. Nevertheless, the opinions reflecting Frankfurter's
strict adherence to patterns of restraint lend impressive added weight to those
other opinions written or concurred in by Frankfurter--opinions like those
in the School Cases-which test state action on its merits and find it incom-
patible with freedoms contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.
EsCAPE FRom JUDGMENT
Back in the days of innocence, there was plenty of time for critics of the
Supreme Court's work to stick pins in dolls and call it scholarship. More
recently, however, there has been wider recognition that the "attitudes of
the Justices are a problem in national policy, and the study of the Court's work
is not advanced by the pressure of factionalism."' 13 The cult of personality
5. Ibid.
6. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948) (concurring opinion).
7. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (concurring opinion); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (concurring opinion).
8. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
9. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (separate opinion). Generally,
the issue is deemed not justiciable because "to the expert feel of lawyers," it is not
cut from the stuff of "case or controversy." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion). Sometimes an undoubted
"case" is thought to be one in which equity should stay its hand. E.g., Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
10. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 115 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
11. Rodell, Book Review, 56 YAI.a L.J. 1462, 1465-66 (1947).
12. Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter-Law and Choice, 10 VAND. L. REv. 333,
334 (1957).
13. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1469 (1947).
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has declined. Controversy over whether Justice Black is an "activist"'14 has
been at least partly displaced by the realization that the "Court is hard enough
to understand and to predict, without forcing all analysis to choose between
being pro- or anti-Mr. Justice Black."'u Similarly, the vexing question
whether Justice Frankfurter is "a fallen liberal angel"' 6 has given way to more
general awareness of the question's essential meaninglessness: in the perform-
ance of his duties, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter is . . . no more a conservative
than he is a liberal. It is of the very essence of his judicial philosophy that
his role as a judge precludes him from having a program couched in these
terms of choice.
' '17
Subtler and more persistent has been the notion that ex-professor Frank-
furter "remained a rather narrow academician, engrossed in the trivia of
formal legal propriety . . . to the disregard of the tough stuff of judicial
statesmanship."' s The charge was put most cuttingly a decade ago in Walton
Hamilton's seductive elegy on the nine young men. "It does no good," he
wrote charitably, "to impute personal blame. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has no
feel for the dominant issues; he operates best when weaving crochet patches
of legalism on the fingers of the case. He does the best he can, often very
well indeed, with the techniques in which he is proficient; it is a calamity
that his skills happen to be petty skills. He is the victim of a bad legal edu-
cation . . .19
If faulty education has made it difficult for Frankfurter to cope with the
"dominant issues," it has not been for want of good teachers. If it is true
that "our present judges have gone to school.., to Holmes and Cardozo,"'
it is especially true of the judge widely regarded on his appointment as "the
right and unmistakable choice to fill the seat held by Cardozo and before him
by Holmes."
21
14. See Rodell, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1462, 1465-66 (1947); Douglas, Mr.
Justice Black: A Foreword, 65 YALE L.J. 449 (1956).
15. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1469 (1947).
16. Powell, Judicial Protection of Civil Rights, 29 IowA L. REv. 383, 394 (1944).
17. Jaffe, The Judicial Univcrse of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REv. 357,
358 (1949).
18. RODELL, NINE MEN 271 (1955).
19. Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1458, 1460 (1947). In an abundance of
generosity, Hamilton also outlined a variant and more courteous possibility-that Frank-
furter was not so much stupid as malevolent. "Frankfurter affects a lack of concern
for the 'end product'; yet his votes are to be predicted in terms of the end product.
You can almost always tell where he is coming out; yet not even the faithful can tell in
advance how his stand is to be legalized. Frankfurter spurns 'policy' and professes to
lay the law down on the line. Yet he usually gets to the same place as Jackson whose law is
not unspotted by the world. The work of the current term is marked by numerous
instances of the search for a decent way of doing an indecent thing." Ibid.
20. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREmF COURT 36 (1951).
21. Editorial, Justice Frankfurter, 148 THE NATIoN 51, 52 (1939). Frankfurter, in
"the last piece . . . [he] wrote before he was nominated for membership on the Supreme
Court," FRANIFURTER, LAW AXD POLITICS 88 (1939), observed that "the history of the
[ Vol. 67: 304
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From his predecessors, Frankfurter probably did not acquire much of that
"competence in the discussion of substantive questions," which, according to
Walton Hamilton, "Douglas, Black, et al. have," but which Frankfurter shuns
in order to "operate in the procedural field where he has confidence in his
own footing."122 To be sure, Frankfurter might have "gone to school" to his
predecessors in substantive matters. For, as Frankfurter has pointed out,
Holmes and Cardozo were themselves signal exceptions to the general rule
that because "the raw materials of public law controversies are contemporary
affairs ... understanding of their significance is seldom achieved on the bench
without considerable prior immersion in affairs."'23 Nevertheless, what Frank-
furter principally learned from Holmes and Cardozo related to matters of
judicial method-the limitations which the judicial process imposes on those
charged with its responsible exercise, especially in constitutional cases. Their
scholarly and their judicial writings combined to instill in Frankfurter a sense
of the importance of distinguishing "the austere responsibility of a judge from
the ample discretion of the legislator,"24 and wakened an early understanding
of why it "is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious
sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law."' 25 What
Frankfurter inherited from Holmes and Cardozo were those habits of
humility and restraint which they in their different ways-each building in
some measure on the fundamental teachings of Professor Thayer 2 brought
to the job of constitutional adjudication.
Supreme Court affords no analogue to the unanimity of lay as well as professional opinion
that Chief Judge Cardozo was the one man adequate to fill the historic place vacated by
Holmes." Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE L.J. 458 (1939), 39
COLUM. L. Rav. 88 (1939), 52 HARv. L. REv. 440 (1939), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, LAW
AND POLITICS 88, 89 (1939) (hereinafter cited as LAW AND POLITICS).
22. Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1458, 1459-60 (1947).
23. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE L.J. 458, 462 (1939), 39.
COLUm. L. REv. 88, 92 (1939), 52 HARV. L. REv. 440, 444 (1939), reprinted in LAW AND
POLITICS 88, 92. See also FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT
24 (1938).
"Throughout its history the Supreme Court has called for statesmanship-the gifts of
mind and character fit to rule nations. The capacity to transcend one's own limitations,
the imagination to see society as a whole, come, except in the rarest instance, from wide
experience. Only the poetic insight of the philosopher can replace seasoned contact with
affairs." FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 317 (1928).
24. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE L.J. 458, 471 (1939),
39 COLUM. L. Rav. 88, 101 (1939), 52 HAzv. L. REv. 440, 453 (1939), reprinted in LAW
AND POIrTIcs 88, 95.
25. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295 (1921), quoted in FRANKFURTER, MR.
JusTIca HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1938).
26. See THAYER, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS 1 (1908). This influence persists: "[T]hat James Bradley Thayer
was no more when my class entered the School has been a lifelong bereavement for at
least one member of that class." Frankfurter, Joseph H. Beale, 56 HARv. L. REV. 701, 702
(1943), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 265 (1956).
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From Brandeis-to whom he also went to school-Frankfurter learned
further of restraint. "The history of the Court and the nature of its business
admonish against needless or premature decisions. It has no greater duty
than the duty not to decide or not to decide beyond its circumscribed author-
ity."2 7 With Brandeis the principle was "absolutely basic."'2 8 Rather than
join the majority which upheld the sale of electric power by the Tennessee
Valley Authority,29 or join what may for a time have been a majority ready
to sustain the ill-fated Child Labor Tax Act, 0 Brandeis would in both in-
stances have subordinated what must have been strong predilections on the
merits to his conviction that dismissal should be predicated on the plaintiffs'
lack of standing to sue.
Brandeis's insistence on fidelity to jurisdictional limitations was partly a
method for keeping lesser judges within the realms of competence from which
he, Holmes and Cardozo so seldom strayed. But the insistence was also, as
Frankfurter has noted, something more. "In view of our federalism and the
Court's peculiar function, questions of jurisdiction in constitutional adjudica-
tions imply questions of political power."3 1 To overstep the limitations is not
mere unwisdom, it is usurpation.
Performance of the Court's most delicate revisory task-the review of
state court judgmefits- -3 2 has, since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 33 and Cohens
v. Virginia,34 largely depended on scrupulous adherence to jurisdictional limi-
tations. "If it is found that no such [federal] question is raised or decided
in the court below, then all will concede that... [the writ] must be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.13 5 Moreover, when a federal question has been duly
27. Frankfurter, Mlr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L. REv. 33, 79
(1931), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS 113, 120. Frankfurter was plainly echoing
Brandeis's remark to him: "The most important thing we do is not doing." BicxnL, TnE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JusTIcE BRANDEIS 17 (1957).
28. Freund, Introduction to BICKEL, op. cit. supra note 27, at xvi.
29. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
30. Professor Bickel's extremely illuminating research into Brandeis's unpublished
opinions suggests that the statute invalidated in 1922 in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20 (1922), was nearly sustained in 1920, after the first argument in Atherton Mills
v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922), notwithstanding Brandeis's vehement jurisdictional ob-
jection to that earlier proceeding. Whether or not a majority would have voted to uphold
the statute, Brandeis plainly would have done so had he been able to satisfy his jurisdic-
tional scruples. But in 1922, he joined the majority which, in the Child Labor Tax Case,
struck down the statute as an attempt to circumvent Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918), in which Holmes, Brandeis and others had dissented. See Bic=ui, op.
cit. supra note 27, at 1-20.
31. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARv. L. REy. 33, 79
(1931), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS 113, 120.
32. See Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. Ray. 1,
161 (1913).
33. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
34. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 257 (1821).
35. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 627 (1875).
[ Vol. 67 :304
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"raised, and presented to the State court," the Supreme Court's appellate
authority extends only to that question, not to the case as a whole. 6
The classic example of steadfast application of these postulates is, of
course, Brandeis's concurrence for Holmes and himself in the Whitney case.3 7
Miss Whitney had been found guilty of joining and helping to organize the
California Communist Labor Party in violation of a criminal syndicalism act
which-in terms not unprophetic of the present Smith Act-banned organi-
zation of, or knowing membership in, any group formed "to advocate, teach
or aid and abet criminal syndicalism," a doctrine espousing violence "as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effect-
ing any political change."'38 In the state courts, her lawyers had made a
general constitutional challenge to the validity of the statute as applied. The
Court majority, through Justice Sanford, found no difficulty in sustaining the
inhibition on Miss Whitney's freedom of speech as a reasonable exercise of
California's police power. For Brandeis and Holmes, whose "opinion . . .
seems destined to live as long as the ideals of democracy survive,"3 9 Miss
Whitney's case cut deeper. "Men feared witches and burnt women. It is
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears ...
Only an emergency can justify repression .... The fact that speech is likely
to result in some violence ... is not enough to justify suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the State."40
"Whether, in 1919, when Miss Whitney did the things complained of, there
was in California such clear and present danger of serious evil, might have
been made the important issue in the case"4 1-- might have been, but had not
been. Miss Vhitney's lawyers had not, in the state courts, sought directly
to overcome the "testimony which tended to establish . . . a conspiracy . . .
to commit present serious crimes; and likewise to show that such a conspiracy
would be furthered by the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was
a member. '42 Counsel's technical error was beyond the power of Brandeis
and Holmes to repair:
"Our power of review ... is limited not only to the question whether
a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied . . . but to
the particular claims duly made below, and denied .... We lack here the
power occasionally exercised on review of judgments of lower federal
courts to correct . . . vital errors, although the objection was not taken
in the trial court. . . . This is a writ of error to a state court. Because we
may not enquire into the errors now alleged, I concur in affirming the
judgment . . .,43
36. Id. at 635-36.
37. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). See FREUND, ON UNDERSTAND-
ING THE SUPREME COURT 62 (1951); Mendelson, supra note 12, at 333; BICKEL, Op. Cit.
supra note 27, at 17.
38. 274 U.S. at 360.
39. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 333.
40. 274 U.S. at 376-78.
41. Id. at 379.
42. Ibid.
43. Id. at 380.
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In the Terminiello case in 1949, Frankfurter revealed himself the bondslave
of similar technicalities. 44 The defendant, an unfrocked priest allied with
Gerald L. K. Smith, addressed a larke public meeting in Chicago; using
vicious invective and innuendo, he called on "Fellow Christians" to resist an
alleged Jewish-Communist revolution led by Eleanor Roosevelt, Henry Wal-
lace, Henry Morgenthau and others. His speech was widely advertised.
During its course, a counterdemonstration of some fifteen hundred persons
milled about outside, breaking windows, manhandling persons entering the
hall and yelling insults at those within. Terminiello's highly provocative
speech, delivered to those inside the hall in this inflamed context, was the
basis for a conviction under the municipal ordinance relating to disorderly
conduct. The argument in the Supreme Court "focused on the issue of
whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting
words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. '45
But Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority composed of himself and Justices
Black, Reed, Murphy and Rutledge, found it unnecessary to "reach that
question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case."'40
The "preliminary question" arose from the trial judge's construction of the
ordinance; his charge to the jury permitted conviction if Terminiello's speech
were found to be one which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. ' '47 Douglas asked
whether this charge had not authorized a guilty verdict predicated not at all
upon the constitutionally requisite finding that the defendant had uttered
"fighting words" '48 which might have triggered a riot.
Thus framing the preliminary question, Douglas easily answered it in
Terminiello's favor. A conviction that might lie within so wide an ambit could
not stand, for "a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger.
'49
The only difficulty with Douglas's disposition of the case-a reiteration of
"generalized approbations of free speech with whic, , in the abstract, no one
will disagree" 5Q0-is that the decisive preliminary question was not properly
before the Supreme Court. As Frankfurter observed in dissent, it was "not
raised by counsel in the Illinois courts, not made the basis of a petition for
certiorari here-not included in the 'Questions Presented,' nor in the 'Reasons
Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ'-and explicitly disavowed at the
bar of this Court." 51
44. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 8 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
45. Id. at 3.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. 337 U.S. at 4.
50. Id. at 13 (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
51. Id. at 9. Chief Justice Vinson, in dissent, said the question "was no part of the
[Vol. 67: 304
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Douglas felt that since Terminiello had challenged the application of the
ordinance to his conduct, attaching importance to his failure to challenge the
trial court's construction of the statute would be to "strain at technicalities.
'52
And he cited Stromberg v. California-the Red Flag case-to prove his
point. 3 But Stronberg-as Frankfurter and Chief Justice Vinson pointed
out 5 4 -is little comfort; more precisely, it is authority to the contrary. The
case involved a prosecution under a statute making it a felony to display a
red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government
or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda
that is of a seditious character." The defendant attacked the statute as an
abridgment of free speech and raised no separate objection to the judge's
instructions that adopted the disjunctive language of the statute, rather than
the conjunctive language of the information. The state appellate court sus-
tained the statute and the conviction because, as it explicitly determined, at
least one of the three possible bases of conviction was in its view constitution-
ally permissible. The Supreme Court, turning the syllogism around, reversed
because the first of the possible bases of conviction was "invalid on its face,"5 6
and a general verdict that might have rested upon it could not be sustained.
Stromberg, in short, was a case in which the exact federal question raised and
decided below-the alleged invalidity of specific statutory language adopted
by the trial judge and perhaps relied upon by the jury-was the exact federal
question reviewed by the Supreme Court. It is hardly authority for the
proposition that the Supreme Court can review language employed by the
trial judge which departs from challenged statutory language and which is
never separately brought in question before any state court.57
"The relations between ... state and federal government raise
questions all of which can and, indeed, must be treated by a conscientious
judge as questions of jurisdiction. The 'liberal' may, it is true, ask
simply whether the law in question is a good or a bad one. . . . But to
Mr. Justice Frankfurter such questions as these, at least at the threshold,
concern the respective spheres of governmental power."58
case until this Court's independent research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat con-
fused record." Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 6.
53. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
54. 337 U.S. at 7, 9-10.
55. 283 U.S. at 361. (Emphasis added.)
56. Id. at 370.
57. These observations do not impinge on the quite irrelevant doctrine that a state
court's construction of a state statute-however discrepant it may appear-is binding on
the federal courts. Terminiello's initial challenge to the ordinance preceded the instruc-
tion which gave such unanticipated latitude to the ordinance. After conviction, Termi-
niello persisted in his attack on the ordinance but without ever directing any appellate
court's attention to the breadth the ordinance had assumed at trial. The inference is
hardly reasonable, therefore, that the Illinois appellate courts approved and measured
against the Fourteenth Amendment the trial court's unchallenged interpretation of the
ordinance as a proscription on utterance which "invites dispute."
58. Jaffe, The Jitdicial Universe of Mr. Jitstice Frankfurter, 62 HAv. L. REv. 357,
378-79 (1949).
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Thus, for Frankfurter, the course adopted by the Terminiello majority
struck at the foundations of judicial responsibility:
"Only the uninformed will deride as a merely technical point objection
to what the Court is doing in this case. The matter touches the very
basis of this Court's -authority in reviewing the judgments of State
courts.... The relation of the United States and the courts of the United
States to the States and the courts of the States is a very delicate matter.
It is too delicate to permit silence when a judgment of a State court
is reversed in disregard of the duty of this Court to leave untouched
an adjudication of a State unless that adjudication is based upon a claim
of a federal right which the State has had an opportunity to meet and
to recognize. If such a federal claim was neither before the State court
nor presented to this Court, this Court unwarrantably strays from its
province in looking through the record to find some federal claim that
might have been brought to the attention of the State court and, if so
brought, fronted, and that might have been, but was not, urged here.
This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not
sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations
of individual expediency."' 9
As a practical matter, what the Terminiello majority did was to decide a
case that not only was not before it but that had never, in any adversary sense,
existed anywhere. By bringing the powerful artillery of free speech to bear
on the trial court's unchallenged instructions, the majority spared itself the
difficult task of measuring that fundamental freedom against the actual content
and context of Terminiello's speech. The majority was thus able, wrote Justice
Jackson, to judge "Terminiello's speech . . . as if he had spoken to persons
as dispassionate as empty benches, or like a modem Demosthenes practicing
his Philippics on a lonely seashore." 60
Why did Douglas and his brethren of the majority indulge in this shadow
play? One can only conjecture; but certain inferences may be in order. As
judges deeply committed to the principles of the First Amendment, they must
have been profoundly concerned at imposing criminal sanctions on the making
of a political speech, however obnoxious. On the other hand, the five Justices
may have found great difficulty in agreeing on a rationale for denying municip-
al power to punish conduct which could well have precipitated widespread
violence. The avenue of escape which Douglas found was to decide not the
case reviewed by the Illinois appellate courts but another and less exacting
case which would not ruffle the placid waters of the First Amendment. And,
fortuitously, such a case was at hand-one that counsel could have, but had
not, brought to the Supreme Court. To refrain from deciding the tractable
case, to insist on deciding the case actually presented, merely because of
notions that the Court's "power of review . . . is limited ... to the particular
claims duly made below, and denied,""' would be to "strain at technicalities.1
0 2
59. 337 U.S. at 10-11.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 380 (1927) (concurring opinion).
62. 337 U.S. at 6.
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After all, if one had, in Walton Hamilton's words, any "feel for the dominant
issues,"'0 3 the trial court's instructions were plainly unsupportable and should
have been so declared. "Where Frankfurter was the circumspect backer-away
from issues, Douglas, like Brandeis, his predecessor in crusade, wanted always
to hit them head-on."
64
Terminiello, decided eight years ago, was a test of judicial responsibility.65
It has its current analogue in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.6 Sweezy was a
companion case to Watkins v. United States 67-a companion in that both
cases were set for argument together, were decided on the same day and
involved contempt convictions for refusal to answer questions about alleged
left-wing activity or belief.
In Watkins, defendant, a union organizer, refused to answer questions put
to him by the Un-American Activities Committee about persons who may once
have been communists but, to his best knowledge, no longer were. The Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Harlan and Brennan, concluded that the purposes of the investiga-
tion were too vague to permit the witness to know whether the questions were
relevant.68 Accordingly, on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, the con-
viction was reversed.
The Chief justice also wrote the prevailing opinion in Sweezy. Professor
Sweezy had refused to answer certain questions asked by the Attorney General
of New Hampshire pursuant to a legislative mandate to investigate subversion.
The questions centered upon Sweezy's alleged advocacy of Marxism or related
doctrines in a lecture delivered at the University of New Hampshire, and upon
his wife's and others' involvement in the Progressive Party and the Progressive
Citizens of America. The Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan, expressed grave and eloquent concern at the
questions' apparent trespass upon reserved fields of academic freedom and
political belief. "We do not," said Warren, "now conceive of any circumstance
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields.
But we do not need to reach such fundamental questions of state power
to decide this case."
' 9
Ultimate issues could be avoided because the legislative mandate was so
general that the Court could not conclude that the New Hampshire legislature
63. See text at note 19 supra.
64. RODELL, NINE MFN 273 (1955).
65. Two proper choices lay before the Court in Terminiello. The case might have
been decided on the "fighting words" basis on which the Illinois courts treated it. See
Vinson's dissent, 337 U.S. at 7. This choice was favored by Vinson, Frankfurter, Jackson
and Burton, but their feeling that the facts warranted affirmance is, in the writer's view,
erroneous. The alternative was to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
66. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
67. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
68. Justice Clark dissented; Justices Burton and Whittaker did not participate. Justice
Frankfurter, having joined the Chief Justice's opinion, also concurred separately.
69. 354 U.S. at 251.
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regarded the Attorney General's questions as essential to the security of the
state.
"Petitioner had been interrogated by a one-man legislative committee,
not by the legislature itself.
".... The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the infor-
mation the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be
treated as the absence of authority. It follows that the use of the contempt
power, notwithstanding the interference with constitutional rights, was
not in accordance with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
70
Frankfurter's concurrence, like his dissent in Terminiello, reached the real
merits of the controversy. Warren's rationale was untenable, for the finding
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that Attorney General Wyman was
acting in accordance with authority duly delegated to him was a matter of
state law which the Supreme Court was powerless to review. The Court's
opinion in Dreyer v. Illinois 71 had, as Frankfurter pointed out,72 long ago put
any such issue beyond federal scrutiny:
"Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall
be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections
of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters,
exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the State. And its determination
one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether the due
process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been re-
spected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters
involving life or liberty.
'T3
Forced to turn to the merits-the power of New Hampshire to exact
answers to the questions propounded-Frankfurter wrote an historic affirma-
tion of the primacy of free scholarly inquiry and free political discussion
and activity. As against those interests, the justifications urged by New
70. Id. at 251-52, 254-55.
71. 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
72. 354 U.S. at 256-57.
73. 187 U.S. at 84. Warren acknowledged the rule but seemed to regard it as no bar to
his decision. 354 U.S. at 255. The rationale of the Sweeay majority provoked quaint but per-
haps not wholly inappropriate response in New Hampshire. The Sweecy case was decided on
June 17, 1957. On July 10, 1957, the New Hampshire House and Senate, "in general
court convened," declared by way of joint resolution that "this general court is, and for
a long time has been, familiar with the questions put to Paul M. Sweezy by the attorney
general acting in this state, authorized these questions, wanted and continues to want
the information which is sought by these questions, and has enacted this resolution for
the specific purpose of removing the doubt which has been expressed by the United States
Supreme Court." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, October 1956 Term, No. 175, Petition for
Rehearing 2. Armed with this retrospective vindication by his legislature, Attorney
General Wyman sought rehearing, but rehearing was denied at the start of the 1957 Term.
78 Sup. Ct. 7 (1957).
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Hampshire for invading Sweezy's privacy seemed to Frankfurter and Harlan
paltry and insubstantial.
"[S]triking the balance implies the exercise of judgment. This is the
inescapable judicial task in giving substantive content, legally enforced,
to the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this
Court.... Such a judgment must be arrived at in a spirit of humility
when it counters the judgment of the State's highest court. But in the
end, judgment cannot be escaped-the judgment of this Court.
74
EXPOUNDING A CONSTITUTION
Escape from judgment may be hard, but the prevailing opinions managed
it in Teruiniello and in Sweezy. Frankfurter, in each instance unable to find
judicial power to utilize an attractive detour around decision, was compelled
to grapple with the case on its "merits"-to resolve the genuinely "dominant
issues." But in these and hundreds of other cases, the problem Frankfurter
regards as no less significant than the substantive controversy is the some-
times "technical" question whether the controversy can and should be resolved
by the Court.
Thus it is that Frankfurter "is forever disposing of issues by assigning their
disposition to some other sphere of competence. ' 75 On a national level, judicial
deference to Congress and the administrative agencies-forums of primary
responsibility and, hopefully, greater expertise-is, for Frankfurter, a vital
aspect of the separation of powers. On a state level, Frankfurter's federalism
dictates extreme reluctance to interfere unnecessarily in local policies and
processes, judicial or otherwise. In each instance, plainly enough, Frankfurter
feels that "dispersion of the power to govern . . . . is the essence of our
system.' 76 And complementary factors also come into play: a reluctance to
use precious judicial time on minor matters which can be or have already been
more profitably canvassed elsewhere,7 7 and an insistence on scrupulous adher-
ence to the Court's "settled tradition against needlessly pronouncing on con-
stitutional issues." 8
74. 354 U.S. at 267.
75. Jaffe, supra note 58, at 359.
76. Mendelson, Mfr. Justice Frankfurter-Law and Choice, 10 VAND. L. REV. 333,
336 (1957).
77. See, e.g., Frankfurter's dissent in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500,
524 (1957). Compare his vigorous fidelity to Brandeis's decision in Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)-a manifestation both of Frankfurter's deference to state
authority in fields reserved to the states and of his impatience with a vast category of
private litigation which federal courts have neither the time, the day-to-day competence
nor the prime authority to handle in fruitful fashion. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); cf. Bank v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956).
78. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217, 235
(1955), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 3, 25 (1956). See Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Eisler v. United States, 333 U.S. 189, 190 (1949), protesting
the unwillingness of the Court to dismiss the writ of certiorari, rather than "merely
postpone review indefinitely," where the defendant had fled the country after argument
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In short, a major part of Frankfurter's judicial energy is spent in drawing
lines between what should and what should not be judged. There may be
ample room for disagreement with his emphases. But the process is one which
itself calls for judgments which no aware judge can conscientiously escape.
When Frankfurter determines that he must address himself to the ultimate
substantive issues, he is, of course, guided by canons of judicial restraint as
compelling as those that caution him against reaching such issues before they
are duly presented. "If judges want to be preachers, they should dedicate
themselves to the pulpit; if judges want to be primary shapers of policy,
the legislature is their place. Self-willed judges are the least defensible
offenders against government under law."79
Especially is this true of Justices exercising the Supreme Court's power,
under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, to veto state action.
A generation ago, Frankfurter felt that the power "ought to go."80 The vi-
carious partner in so many Holmes and Brandeis dissents perceived that the
words of the amendment "mean what the shifting personnel of the United
States Supreme Court from time to time makes them mean. The inclination
of a single Justice, the tip of his mind--or his fears-determines the oppor-
tunity of a much-needed social experiment to survive, or frustrates, at least
for a time, intelligent attempt to deal with a social evil." 8' Nor did the possi-
bility of occasional invalidation of state restrictions on free inquiry and ex-
pression alter the arithmetic-he viewed "the cost of this power of the Supreme
Court on the whole as greater than its gains."82 And, in any event, "the real
battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court" but through "a
persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts
of the community."
8 3
and before decision; later the writ was dismissed. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S.
833 (1949).
It is noteworthy that Frankfurter contributed to the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences
both the article entitled Supreme Court, United States, 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE s 474 (1934), and the article entitled Advisory Opinion, 1 id. at 475.
But even Frankfurter has not been able wholly to refrain from excursions into constitut-
tional essays not required by the case before him. See Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. -Corp., 343 U.S. 437 (1955); cf. Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 469-84 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38 (1957).
79. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. Rsv. 217,
238 (1955), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 3, 29 (1956).
80. Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, 40 NEW REPUBLIC 110, 113 (1924),
reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS 10, 16. Apparently, Frankfurter felt the same about
Fifth Amendment due process as a veto on federal action, for his exact words were that
"the due process clauses ought to go."
81. Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, unsigned editorial,
43 NEW REPUBLIC 85, 86 (1925), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS 195, 196.
82. Ibid., reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS at 196-97.
83. 43 id. at 87, reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS at 197. Frankfurter echoed himself
years later, dissenting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670-71
(1943). With Barnette, compare cases cited notes 87-89 infra.
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As a judge, Frankfurter of course accepted the due process clause and
acquiesced in that view of its scope which Brandeis and Holmes at last acknow-
ledged: "Despite arguments... which had seemed ... persuasive, it is settled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure."8 4 And, for Frankfurter,
due process of law means that amalgam of rights, substantive and procedural
alike, which, in Cardozo's phrase, inhere in "the concept of ordered liberty." 85
Situations in which Frankfurter has found violations of substantive due
process have been, not too surprisingly, infrequent. Sweezy is one recent
instance.8 6 Everson,8 7 McCollum,8 8 and Zorach v. Clauson 8s--the trilogy
of cases on separation of church and school--collectively form a second. The
84. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion).
85. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
86. Black and Douglas, who were unwilling to go as far as Frankfurter in Sweezy,
have, of course, been the firmest members of the Court in their insistence on protecting
free speech and related rights. See, e.g., their dissenting opinions in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 579, 581 (1951). The quarrel over whether free speech occupies
a "preferred position"-see, e.g., the concurrence by Frankfurter and the dissent by Rut-
ledge in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97, 104-06 (1949)-deriving largely from
intimations in the famous Carolene Products footnote, United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), may perhaps now be recognized as a principally verbal
dispute in view of Frankfurter's statement in Sweezy: "In the political realm, as in
the academic, thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political
authority." 354 U.S. at 266. Compare Professor ahn's tribute to Black, Cahn, The
Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 471 (1956), and Frankfurter's obser-
vation for the Court in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956) : "To view
a particular provision of the Bill of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a con-
stricted application of it. This is to disrespect the Constitution." But whatever view be
taken of the firstness of the First Amendment, the secondness of the Second Amendment
is demonstrable. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Warren has given signs of sharing the Black-Douglas commitment to free speech.
See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), in which
Frankfurter sustained an injunction against picketing, and Douglas wrote a dissent on
free speech grounds in which Warren and Black joined. Each of the Vogt opinions is
a signal example of failure fully to come to grips with the Court's prior positions:
contrast Frankfurter's retrospective emasculation of his (today untenable) reversal of an
injunction against peaceful picketing in AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), with
Douglas's reluctance to acknowledge that Black's opinion for a unanimous Court in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), is the foundation for current
Supreme Court acquiescence in state restraints on peaceful picketing. Compare Youngdahl
v. Rainfair, Inc., 26 U.S.L. WEax 4031 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957), illustrating the use, in labor
disputes affecting interstate commerce, of preemption rather than the weary free speech
doctrines as a rationale for voiding state injunctions against peaceful picketing.
87. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Frankfurter was one of four
Justices dissenting from Black's view that a New Jersey community could subsidize
bus service to Catholic schools.
88. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Frankfurter,
for the four Everson dissenters, concurred in invalidating the Champaign, Illinois program
permitting religious instruction during public school class hours.
89. 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952). Frankfurter dissented from Douglas's opinion sustain-
ing the New York "released time" program.
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dissent of Frankfurter and Douglas in International Harvester v. Goodrich
is a significant third instance, for it serves as a reminder that substantive due
process protects property rights as well as civil liberties. 0 Finally, the School
Cases might have constituted another instance resolved on due process
grounds, had equal protection not been an available rationale.91 None of these
illustrates judicial timidity or a lack of understanding of "dominant issues."
Nor does lack of courage or insight characterize Frankfurter's approach to
procedural due process. Particularly, the great Adamson 92 debate-in which
the Court rejected the Black-Douglas-Murphy-Rutledge view that the Four-
teenth Amendment makes applicable to the states all the specific limitations
of the first eight amendments 93 -has been considerably less significant on a
90. 350 U.S. 537, 548 (1956). The case tested the validity of the priority given a
New York tax lien on certain heavy vehicles using New York highways and therefore
subject to a state highway use tax. Frankfurter and Douglas objected to giving priority
to the tax liens as against the interest of the conditional vendor in certain of the vehicles
where the tax liabilities and hence the liens arose from the operation by the conditional
vendee of other vefiicles prior to the conditional purchase of the vehicles involved.
Douglas's position suggests his tacit abandonment of his (and Black's) occasional view
that corporations are not "persons" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wheel-
ing Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (dissenting opinion), and the
separate opinion of Jackson, id. at 574. See also Black's dissent in Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938).
91. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ; cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The equal protection clause has a specificity of function which
might seem to make it a readier weapon-although of more limited scope-than its com-
panion due process clause. In regulatory cases not involving race distinctions, however,
both Frankfurter and Black have displayed a readiness to sustain the reasonableness of
challenged classifications which parallels their deeply ingrained resistance to invalidating
state action on due process grounds. Compare Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
(Frankfurter opinion, in which Black joined, sustaining Michigan statute prohibiting
a woman from acting as a barmaid unless she is "the wife or daughter of the male
owner"), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidating, over dissents by Black,
and by Frankfurter and Harlan, an Illinois statute regulating "currency exchanges"
engaged in selling money orders, because the American Express Company was specifically
exempted from the regulatory scheme). Douglas joined Rutledge and Murphy in dissent
in Goesaert v. Cleary and joined Burton's opinion for the Court in Morey v. Doud.
A decision with which Black and Frankfurter should feel increasing dissatisfaction upon
continued reflection is Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), sustain-
ing the nepotistic Louisiana practice for licensing pilots at the port of New Orleans. The de-
cision for the Court was by Black; Rutledge, joined by Reed, Douglas and Murphy,
dissented. It is hard to suppose that Black and Frankfurter would have sustained the
application of similar criteria, for example, to admission to the bar. Compare, as to ex-
clusions from the bar invalidated on due process grounds, Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (concurring opinion) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252 (1957). (Frankfurter dissented from the latter decision because of the "techni-
cality" that the record was ambiguous as to whether the federal question had been passed
on by the state court.) Cf. It re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
92. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
93. See Black's dissenting opinion, id. at 68. Murphy and Rutledge were "not pre-
pared to say that the latter [the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment] is entirely
and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights." Id. at 124. Moreover, even Black and
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practical than a conceptual level. And this is especially true of the differences
separating the chief protagonists-Frankfurter on the one hand, Black and
Douglas on the other.04 Probably the major single difference of view is on
the necessity of counsel in state criminal proceedings. Following Powell v.
Alabama 95 and Betts v. Brady,9" Frankfurter finds due process offended
by lack of counsel only in capital cases or where the likelihood of resultant
prejudice is susceptible of fairly ready inference.97 Distaste for an issue about
which he may feel on shaky ground 98 perhaps explains the unpersuasive
dogmatism which, on occasion, Frankfurter has invoked to find the right to
counsel issue not properly presented. 99
Frankfurter's present readiness to join Court majorities ruling confessions
coerced 100 represents a marked shift from the rigidity of the Ashcraft dissent
Douglas "are not content ... to rest on the specific guarantees of the first eight Amend-
ments." FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1949). See also
John Frank's discussion (Book Review, 24 IND. L.J. 139, 144 n.10 (1948)), to which
Professor Freund refers.
94. Burton is the only other member of the Adamson Court still sitting.
95. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
96. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
97. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1947); Jaffe, The Judicial Universe
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REv. 357, 403 (1949).
98. Compare FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 35 (1949): "One
may hope that a majority of the Court will turn to the view that the appointment of
counsel is as indispensable to the just and evenhanded administration of the criminal law
in the state courts as in the federal courts. They would be helped to reach this conclusion
by avowing frankly that the Sixth Amendment does not furnish the real reason for the
requirement in the federal courts. It seems more nearly true to regard that Amendment
as having simply conferred the right on the accused to employ counsel-a right which
of course was by no means assured prior to the adoption of the Constitution. If the right
to have counsel appointed in the federal courts is acknowledged to rest on a pervasive
sense of justice, it should be extended to state prosecutions as an element of due process
of law. This would be a happy denouement of the dramatic, the over-dramatic, clash over
the Fourteenth Amendment which has drawn so heavily on the energies of the Court."
Perhaps a majority of the Court is pushing toward Professor Freund's result, without
altering prevailing doctrines, by requiring less rigorous proof of resultant prejudice. See
Moore v. Michigan, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4023 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957).
99. See Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947), in which Frankfurter held that an
attempt to vacate, on lack of counsel grounds, petitioner's first New York conviction as
a prelude to obtaining modification of a subsequent second-offender sentence, was a "flank
attack" the Court would not entertain, notwithstanding the fact that the course petitioner
pursued appeared to be the one indicated by the then applicable state court decisions. In
the right to counsel cases, Frankfurter has shown a reluctance to take advanced positions
which "would furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the prison
doors of the land." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947). The Court, in breaking
new due process ground, is not, however, compelled to give its holdings retroactive
effect. See the limitation imposed by Frankfurter's concurrence in Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956). Compare the postponed enjoyment of the constitutional rights
proclaimed in the School Cases. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
100. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957) (concurring opinion); Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (concurring
opinion).
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in which he concurred.1' 1 But he has had greater trouble with the somewhat
related problem of search and seizure. In Wolf v. Colorado,10 2 he spoke for
the Court in finding the Fourth Amendment's prohibition a part of "the con-
cept of ordered liberty" and hence binding on the states ;103 but his "consensus
of society's opinion which ... is the standard enjoined by the Constitution"'
' 0
persuaded him that exclusion of illegally seized evidence was not a remedy
so widely accepted as to constitute a constitutional mandate for the guidance
of state courts. Rather, it was simply a rule of evidence devised by and for
federal courts. This distinction, acceptable to Black but not to Douglas,'0 ° '
101. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 174 (1944), Jackson, dissenting for
himself, Roberts and Frankfurter from reversal of a conviction based on a confession
provoked by thirty-six consecutive hours of questioning of a defendant held incommunicado,
wrote the following heroically inapposite words: "The use of the due process clause to
disable the States in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate
a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic
experimentation."
102. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
103. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. Frankfurter's view of the importance
of the Fourth Amendment's protection is impressively illustrated by his dissent in Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947). As Frankfurter makes plain in his repeated pro-
tests against wiretapping and kindred practices, his feelings on this score are traceable to his
early years as an assistant to Henry L. Stimson, when Mr. Stimson was United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. "The third degree, search without
warrant, wiretapping and the like, were not tolerated in what was probably the most
successful administration in our time of the busiest United States Attorney's office." On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952) (dissenting opinion). It is reported that
Mr. Stimson, as Secretary of State under President Hoover, closed down a secret
intelligence unit in the State Department on the ground that "A gentleman does not look
at someone else's mail." Esquire, Sept. 1957, p. 32.
104. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (concurring
opinion).
105. Black concurred in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 39. Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dis-
sented, id. at 40, 41, 47, each believing that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional
mandate. The complex evolution of the rule lends support to the dissenters. See Note,
56 Y.LE L.J. 1076, 1077-78 n.11 (1947) : "In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
where the Court invalidated a federal statute providing for the subpoena of personal records
in a forfeiture proceeding, dictum of the a fortiori variety suggested that evidence seized
without a warrant was clearly inadmissible, id. at 633, a departure from the established
common-law rule that courts will not question the legality of acquisition of otherwise
competent evidence. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897) ; see Common-
wealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329, 337-8 (Mass. 1841). The issue was not relitigated before
the Court for eighteen years; then, in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), the
Court, although holding the challenged seizure not unconstitutional, appeared by dictum
inserted arguendo, id. at 594-9, to repudiate the dictum of the Boyd case. The Adams
decision was thought to have buried what seemed at most a momentary heresy. See United
States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338, 340-4 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). Ten years later, however, in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), Justice Day explained for the unanimous
Court that his opinion in the unanimous Adams decision had merely precluded the litiga-
tion of illegal seizure at trial, and that unconstitutionally seized evidence was inadmissible
where a motion to suppress was made in advance of trial. Subsequently the Court per-
mitted exclusion at trial where the defendant had no knowledge of the unlawful seizure
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has returned to plague the Court-and especially Frankfurter. Thus, in
Rochin, Frankfurter with some difficulty articulated the Court's view that
California could not, consistently with due process, put in evidence against a
defendant tried for possession of narcotics, the eminently trustworthy heroin
extracted from the defendant's stomach by a stomach pump.10 6 In Irvine,
Frankfurter in dissent protested the propriety of admitting in evidence in-
criminating conversations overheard by "bugging" defendant's apartment. 107
But at the past term of Court, Frankfurter silently acquiesced in Justice
Clark's opinion upholding a manslaughter conviction where the evidence that
defendant was intoxicated at the time of an automobile accident was blood
taken from him while he was unconscious.108 The Chief Justice spoke for
himself, Black and Douglas in dissent.'09
Frankfurter's difficulties in this shadowland between search and seizure and
self incrimination 110 may be contrasted with his precision in dealing with
other issues of procedural due process: his eloquent protest against Oregon's
placing on an alleged murderer the burden of proving insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt ;111 his lone dissent from Black's view that a defendant seeking a
gubernatorial stay of execution was not entitled to be represented at a medical
until the introduction of the evidence at trial, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305
(1921), or where a pre-trial motion to suppress had been erroneously overruled. Id. at
312-3; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). Conceptually the doctrine of ex-
clusion rests on the theory that the use at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
See Boyd v. United States, supra at 630-5." Judged in this light, the crucial problem
may be whether the privilege against self incrimination has been assimilated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, and Adainson itself shows that it has not been.
106. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
107. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954). Compare Frankfurter's views in
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 204 (1952) (concurring opinion). See also Frankfurter's dissent,
in which Douglas joined, in Rathbun v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4042, 4044 (U.S.
Dec. 9, 1957) ; cf. Benanti v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4045 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957).
108. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Justice Clark, in the Irvine case,
noted that had he been sitting at the time Wolf was decided he "would have applied the
doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to the states," 347 U.S. at
138-thereby compelling exclusion at state trials of illegally seized evidence; but Justice
Clark provided the fifth vote for affirmance in Irvine because "Wolf remains the law
and, as such, is entitled to the respect of this Court's membership." Ibid.
109. 352 U.S. at 440. Douglas and Black also dissented separately. Id. at 442. The
Court may shortly have occasion to consider the problem in a federal context. See Blackford
v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957). Heroin, packaged in a condom, was removed
from defendant's rectum. "There is nothing in the Bill of Rights which makes body cavities
a legally protected sanctuary for carrying narcotics." Id. at 753. Judge Stephens dis-
sented. Id. at 754.
110. For like difficulties, compare Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), in which
Frankfurter joined, with Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). See, generally,
Handler, The Fourth Ainendinent, Federalism and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8 SYRAcusz
L. REv. 166 (1957).
111. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952) (dissenting opinion). Black joined
Frankfurter in dissent.
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inquiry into his claim of insanity ;112 his sense of horror at the possibility that
Pennsylvania might execute a man declared sane by a psychiatrist himself
thereafter adjudged insane. 113
These cases illustrate two of Frankfurter's grave concerns about the ad-
ministration of American criminal law: capital punishment,1 1 4 and the nexus
between crime and mental illness.115 They also illustrate what is fundamental
to Frankfurter's approach to due process of law-that it is a process 116
and not the largely static formula urged by the Adamwon dissenters. The
"process of judicial inclusion and exclusion"'11 to which Frankfurter so often
adverts is a process he has himself been part of, in a long and useful career. lie
saw the views of Tom Mooney's case he helped to formulate nearly forty years
ago ratified by the Supreme Court as a denial of due process nearly two
decades later.118 Thirty years ago, his memorable attack on the insubstantial-
ity of the case against Sacco and Vanzetti 119 went for naught when honorable
judges, including Holmes, were unable to equate the trial judge's prejudice
with a denial of due process. 120 But today such a case would likely fall within
the expanded ambit of those words.
12 '
112. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950). Douglas did not participate.
113. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 570 (1953) (dissenting opinion). Black and
Douglas joined Frankfurter in dissent.
114. See FRANKFUmTER, The Problem of Capital Punishment, in OF LAW AND MEN
77 (1956). Frankfurter's due process clause is avowedly stricter in capital cases, even
where the death sentence is not in fact imposed. See, e.g., his concurrence in Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 41 (1957), recognizing a Fifth Amendment right to trial before a
civilian court rather than a court-martial for dependents of servicemen abroad, at least
in capital cases; cf. the right to counsel problem discussed in text at note 95 supra.
115. Compare Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 477 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
See FRAN FuRTER, The Problem of Capital Punishment, in OF LAW AND MEN 77, 82-97
(1956).
116. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951).
117. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1878).
118. As Secretary and Counsel of the Federal Mediation Commission, which inquired
into the Mooney case, Frankfurter joined in reporting to President Wilson that "the
feeling of disquietude aroused by the case must be heeded, for if unchecked, it impairs
the faith that our democracy protects the lowliest and even the unworthy, against false
accusations.' SYmEs, OuR AERICAN DRiYFus CASE 19 (1935). In 1935, the Court,
in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, although remitting petitioner to the appropriate state
remedy, declared that the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting officials-in particular their
knowing use of perjured evidence---constituted a denial of due process.
119. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, 139 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 409 (1927).
The enormous impact of Frankfurter's masterful analysis of the case is suggested by the
comment of Chief Justice Taft in a letter written after the execution of Sacco and Van-
zetti: "It is remarkable how Frankfuirter [sic] with his article was able to present so
large a body of readers a perverted view of the facts and then through the world-wide
conspiracy of communism spread it to many, many countries." JouGHiN & MORGAN,
THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 308 (1943).
120. Habeas corpus was denied by Holmes, and then, in turn, by Circuit Judge
Anderson and District Judge Morton. 5 THE SAcCO-VANZETrI CASE 5532-34 (1928).
According to Holmes: "I cannot think that prejudice on the part of the presiding judge
however strong would deprive the Court of jurisdiction, that is of legal power to decide
the case, and in my opinion nothing short of a want of legal power to decide the case
[Vot 67: 304
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Determining case by case and year by year the unfolding content of the
Fourteenth Amendment may well be a difficult task. But the process is not
-or at least need not be-the expression of personal whim or the articulation of
a body of "natural law."' 2 2 It is an aspect of a creative task the perspectives
of which Marshall charted for the Court long ago--'we must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding."'123 So considered, the endless process
of adumbrating fundamental limitations on the power of government is part
of the customary growth of the law:
"Little is the positive contribution that any one of us can hope to
make, the impetus that any one of us can give, to the movement forward
through the ages. That little will call for the straining of every faculty,
the bending of every energy, the appeal to every available resource, with-
in us or without. . . .We shall see that our little parish has its vistas
that lie open to the infinite. We shall know that the process of judging
is a phase of a never ending movement, and that something more is ex-
acted of those who play their part in it than imitative reproduction, the
lifeless repetition of a mechanical routine."'
1
To act on a narrower view of the judicial process is to escape from
judgment.
authorizes me to interfere in this summary way with the proceedings of the State Court."
Id. at 5532. A few days later, in a better-known opinion addressed to a somewhat differ-
ent issue, Holmes denied a stay of execution pending the filing of a certiorari petition
to review an unsuccessful attack in the Massachusetts courts. Id. at 5516-17. Justice Stone
also denied a stay. Id. at 5517.
121. Compare United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454 (1956). Dissenting
from the Court's acquiescence in the judicial conduct there attacked, Harlan, with Frank-
furter and Douglas, said: "We should be especially scrupulous in seeing to it that the right
to a fair trial has not been jeopardized by the conduct of a member of the judiciary." Id.
at 469.
122. See, e.g., Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting
opinion). Frankfurter has on occasion candidly admitted the difficulty of determining
when due process is offended. Speaking of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947), in which Louisiana proposed to electrocute for the second time a defendant not
killed the first time, he said: "I was very much bothered by the problem, it offended my
personal sense of decency to do this. Something inside me was very unhappy, but I did not
see that it violated due process of law." FRAN FuRTFa, The Problem of Capital Punishment,
in Or LAW AND Mm 77, 98 (1956).
123. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Frankfurter re-
gards this as "the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law-
most important because most comprehensive and comprehending." Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HAgv. L. REv. 217, 219 (1955), reprinted in FRANK-
FURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 3, 5 (1956).
124. Cauwozo, TE GROWTH OF THE LAW 141-43 (1924). This is of course the an-
tithesis of the imitative process which Frankfurter, following Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), would have federal courts pursue in the disfavored area of divergity
litigation. See note 77 supra; cf. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-96 (1946). But there are also
diverse fashions in judicial imitatiQn. Compare the views of Douglas, speaking for the
Court, with those of Frankfurter, concurring on how a federal court should find state
law, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
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